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ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
Handling Items Not Properly Indorsed
The enactment of section 3-419(1) of Title 10 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes brought to Louisiana the common law notion of
conversion in the act of improperly paying an instrument. By that
section, "when a person pays an instrument on a forged indorse-
ment, he is liable to the true owner." In addition to changing prior
law,' section 3-419(1) raised several questions of interest to Loui-
siana commercial lawyers: 1) Are collecting banks to be considered
under section 3-419(1) as persons who "pay" an instrument? 2) Is a
drawer or maker to be considered as the "true owner" of the instru-
ment? 3) For how much is the paying party to be liable? 4) What
defenses may the paying party raise? 5) Is a party liable under sec-
tion 3-419(1) if he pays an instrument, not on a forged indorsement,
but on a missing indorsement? In the fifteen or so years since the
Uniform Commercial Code gained wide adoption by the states, satis-
factory answers to the first four questions surrounding section
3-419(1) have emerged from the various courts of the country.2 Loui-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The prior Louisiana law is discussed in Hersbergen, The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Commercial Paper, 34 LA. L. REV.
293 (1974).
2. Most of the decisions addressing the issue have held that the drawer is not
the "true owner" and has no right to sue under section 3-419(1). National Sur. Corp. v.
Citizens State Bank, 41 Colo. App. 580, 593 P.2d 362 (1978); Stone & Webster Eng'r
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962); Twellman v.
Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. App. 1976); Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Snyder, 141
N.J. Super. 539, 358 A.2d 859 (1976). In some states, prior law permitted the drawer to
sue one who had paid his item on a forged indorsement. In two cases, this law was
found to have been unaffected by adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Justus
Co. v. Gary Wheaton Bank, 509 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill. 1981); International Indus. Inc.
v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See generally Comment, Com-
mercial Paper: Depositary Bank Liable to Drawer for Payment Over Forged Indorse-
ment, 45 Mo. L. REV. 511 (1980). Drawers have succeeded in direct actions against col-
lecting banks on the theory that a drawer, while not the true owner of the improperly
paid instrument, is the recipient of implied warranties from the collecting bank under
section 3-417(1) or section 4-207(1), as a "payor who in good faith pays" the instrument.
See Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P.2d 920 (1978).
Collecting banks have been unsuccessful, for the most part, in arguing that they
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siana courts may find these answers persuasive.3 In recent years a
split of authority has developed as to the liability under section
3-419(1) of a person who pays an instrument that is missing a
necessary indorsement, but which bears no forged indorsement. The
recent decision in Top Crop Seed & Supply Co. v. Bank of South-
west Louisiana' suggests that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal
would take the view that section 3-419(1) does not apply to the miss-
ing indorsement case. Such a ruling would place the court in the
minority view on that issue.'
are not parties "who pay" within the meaning of U.C.C. section 3-419(1). Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970);
Cooper v. Union Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1. 507 P.2d 609 (1973); Underpinning & Founda-
tions Constructors, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A.. 414 N.Y.S.2d 298, 386 N.E.2d
1319 (1979). See Top Crop Seed & Supply Co. v. Bank of Southwest La., 392 So. 2d 738
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
Section 3-419(2) states that the drawee's liability for payment on a forged indorse-
ment instrument is the face amount of the instrument but that the liability of other
persons is presumed to be the face amount of the instrument. A collecting bank thus
could reduce the true owner's recovery by showing, for example, that the underlying
obligation for which the check was issued has been satisfied. Tette v; Marine Midland
Bank, 435 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Supp. Ct., App. Div. 1981). On the other hand, a drawee might
be liable to a payee whose indorsement had been forged, even though the payee
mistakenly had been named as such, and had no interest in the check. See Mont-
gomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Or. 55, 508 P.2d 428 (1973).
The negligence of the true owner may prevent him from establishing that his
signature is unauthorized. LA. R.S. 10:3-406 (Supp. 1974). The true owner's negligence
can, therefore, be raised in defense of liability by a drawee. Cooper v. Union Bank, 107
Cal. Rptr. 1, 507 P.2d 609 (1973). Section 3-406 does not clearly permit a collecting bank
to raise negligence as a preclusionary bar in an unauthorized indorsement situation,
but logically a collecting bank should be considered an "other payor" under section
3-406 if it is considered to have "paid" the item for purposes of section 3-419(1). In
Cooper, supra, the California Supreme Court side-stepped that issue by allowing the
collecting bank to invoke what the court considered to be the broader equitable estop-
pel principle inherent in the preclusion language of section 3-404(1). Subsequently, the
California court held in Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, supra, that a col-
lecting bank is, in fact, an "other payor" for purposes of section 3-406.
3. The decisions of other jurisdictions under a "borrowed" or common statute
have traditionally been accepted in Louisiana as persuasive on questions of interpreta-
tion. See, e.g., State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958); Standard Oil Co.
v. Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428. 27 So. 2d 268 (1946); Broussard v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert denied, 249 La. 713, 190 So.
2d 233 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1967).
4. 392 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980)..
5. Most of the decisions either hold that section 3-419(1) does apply to the miss-
ing indorsement situation by analogy, or that section 3-419(1) was not intended to
displace the underlying common law conversion liability of a person who pays such an
instrument. The following cases hold that the payment of an instrument on which a
necessary indorsement is missing constitutes conversion: FDIC v. Marine Nat'l Bank of
Jacksonville, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970); State Nat'l Bank v. Sumco Eng'r, Inc., 46
Ala. App. 244. 240 So. 2d 366, cert. denied, 286 Ala. 740, 240 So. 2d 369 (1970); Wilton
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The act of signing a negotiable instrument by a person in a non-
representative capacity obligates the person signing to pay the in-
strument, according to its tenor, as either a primarily or secondarily
liable party.! Unless the instrument itself clearly indicates that a
signature7 thereon is made in some other capacity8 it is deemed to
be an "indorsement."9 An indorsement can be qualified, in which
case no liability, on the instrument, is created as to the person who
signs."0 When the holder of an instrument payable to order" in-
dorses it, his act of indorsing not only creates the normal indorse-
ment engagement," but also constitutes a necessary step in the
passing of title to the instrument and in the establishing of holder
status by the transferee. Stated otherwise, an indorsement by the
holder of an instrument payable to order is necessary for a negotia-
tion of the instrument, for only by a negotiation may a third party
Manors Nat'l Bank v. Adobe Brick & Supply Co., 232 So. 2d 29 (Fla. App. 1970); Trust
Co. of Columbus v. Refrigeration Supplies, Inc., 241 Ga. 406, 246 S.E.2d 282 (1978);
Refrigeration Supplies, Inc. v. Bartley, 144 Ga. App. 141, 240 S.E.2d 566 (1977); In-
surance Co. of N. America v. Atlas Supply Co., 121 Ga. App. 1, 172 S.E.2d 632 (1970);
Peoples Nat'l Bank v. American Fed. Fire Ins. Co., 39 Md. App. 614, 386 A.2d 1254
(1978); Beyer v. First Nat'l Bank of Dillon, 612 P.2d 1285 (Mont. 1980); Capital Dist.
Tel. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Berthiaume, 105 Misc. 2d 529, 432 N.Y.S.2d 435
(Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1980); Edwards Co. v. Long Island Trust Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d 898
(Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1973); Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 270 Or. 807, 529
P.2d 903 (1974); Pacific Metals Co. v. Tracy-Collins Bank, 21 Utah 2d 400, 446 P;2d 303
(1968).
Drug House, Inc. v. Keystone Bank, 414 A.2d 704 (Pa. Super. 1979) holds that sec-
tion 3-419(1) does not apply to the missing indorsement situation. See generally Annot.,
47 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973). Many of the cited cases involved joint payee checks. Historical-
ly, banks have not successfully avoided conversion liability by arguing that the non-
indorsing payee, having never been in actual possession of the check, had no "true
owner" rights therein. See Indiana Plumbing Supply Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 63 Cal. Rptr. 658, 255 Cal. App. 2d 910 (1967); Hoffman v. First
Nat'l Bank. 299 III. App. 290, 20 N.E.2d 121 (1939); House-Evans Co. v. Mattoon
Transfer & Storage Co., 275 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1954).
6. LA. R.S. 10:3-401, 3-403, 3-413, 3-414, 3-415 (Supp. 1974). "Liable," in this con-
text, means only that the party has taken on an engagement to pay.
7. A "signature" on an instrument is made by the use of any name, or by any
word or mark used in lieu of a written signature. LA. R.S. 10:3-401(2) (Supp. 1974). In a
broad sense, "signed" includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with pre-
sent intention to authenticate a writing. LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974). A signature by
an authorized representative obligates the party whose name is signed. LA. R.S.
10:3-403(1) (Supp. 1974).
8. The "other capacity" would include a signing by a maker, drawer, or acceptor.
LA. R.S. 10:3-413 (Supp. 1974).
9. The term "indorsement" is not a defined one in the Commercial Laws, but in
view of LA. R.S. 10:3-401(1) and 3-402 (Supp. 1974), an indorsement is simply a
signature that is not that of a drawer, maker, or acceptor.
10. LA. R.S. 10:3-414(1) (Supp. 1974).
11. LA. R.S. 10:3-110 (Supp. 1974).
12. LA. R.S. 10:3-414(1) (Supp. 1974).
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become a holder of the instrument.'3 Without an indorsement by the
holder, the transferee of an instrument payable to order cannot
himself achieve holder status, and ordinarily it matters not whether
the indorsement is forged or otherwise made in an unauthorized
manner 4 or simply is missing." If the instrument happened to be a
check, the drawee-payor bank could not properly debit the indicated
amount to the drawer's account unless all necessary indorsements
appeared on the instrument, for without them, the check would not
be properly payable.
To the would-be holder and to the drawee-payor bank, there or-
dinarily is no significant difference between the instrument that
bears a forged or otherwise unauthorized necessary indorsement,
and one that is simply missing a necessary indorsement. It is not the
presence of an unauthorized signature on the instrument that is
significant to the transferee or to the payor bank; rather, it is the
absence of the signature of the holder that defeats a negotiation of
the instrument and renders it not properly payable. Similarly, it is
not significant to the implied warranties of parties obtaining pay-
ment or acceptance whether a necessary indorsement is missing or
unauthorized. The implied warranty of title"6 would be breached in
either case. To the transferor of an instrument, an unauthorized
necessary indorsement would mean that two implied warranties
have been breached; in contrast, a missing necessary indorsement
would result in only a breach of the warranty of title."
A holding that section 3-419(1) has no application to the missing
necessary indorsement case would recognize a distinction between
missing indorsements and unauthorized indorsements, and would be
a minority view.'8 Arguably, it would be the correct view. Although
13. LA. R.S. 10:3-201, 3-202 (Supp. 1974). An indorsement also expands the extent
of warranties that are implied from the act of transfer of an instrument. LA. R.S.
10:3-417(2) (Supp. 1974).
14. The term "unauthorized indorsement" includes both the "forgery" and the
signature by one exceeding his authority. LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974).
15. The mere failure of the transferring holder to indorse as he intended to do
would create in the transferee the right to have the intended indorsement. LA. R.S.
10:3-201(3) (Supp. 1974). Once the indorsement was acquired, the transferee would
become a holder. The transferee under a forged or otherwise unauthorized indorse-
ment does not have the right to compel the proper indorsement.
16. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(1)(a), 4-207(1}(a) (Supp. 1974).
17. An unauthorized necessary indorsement would breach both implied transfer
warranties of title and genuine signatures. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(2)(a) & (b), 4-207(2)(a) & (b)
(Supp. 1974). An unauthorized but unnecessary indorsement would not breach the war-
ranty of title, but would breach the warranty as to genuine signatures.
18. See note 5, supra. On the less vexing issue of payment of an instrument bear-
ing not a forged indorsement, but an indorsement by one who exceeded some existing
authority in so indorsing, virtually all decisions hold that section 3-419(1) does apply,
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the effect of the missing indorsement and the forged or otherwise
unauthorized indorsement is often the same in that there is an
unauthorized transfer or presentment in either case, the U.C.C. does
not equate the two situations. 9 More importantly, section 3-419(1) is
unambiguously limited to the forged indorsement case. An incorrect
ruling that section 3-419(1) applies to the missing indorsement case
does not necessarily constitute reversible error in the other U.C.C.
jurisdictions, in view of the underlying common law liability for con-
version. The common law, which arguably is not displaced by U.C.C.
section 3-419(1)," would provide that the act of paying an instrument
that is missing a necessary indorsement is "an exercise of dominion
and control over the instrument inconsistent with the rights of the
owner, thus resulting in liability for conversion."'" This liability for
conversion was not the underlying pre-U.C.C. law of Louisiana;
rather it seems that a true owner to whom Louisiana Revised
Statutes 10:3-419(1) is unavailable must sue his own transferor (or
the drawer or maker, if the owner is the payee) on the unsatisfied
underlying obligation.22 Typically, however, the collecting bank will
ultimately have to answer to the drawee-payor bank for breach of
the implied warranty of title.23 This litigation mode is not only cir-
cuitous, but also it may produce an anomaly in that while the suc-
cessful true owner ordinarily would not be awarded attorney's fees
in a section 3-419(1) case,2 such fees are arguably available in an im-
plied warranty action against a collecting bank."
despite the technical difference between "forged" indorsements and other varieties of
unauthorized indorsements discernible in section 1-201's definition of "unauthorized."
Equipment Distribs., Inc. v. Charter Oak Bank & Trust Co., 34 Conn. Sup. 606, 379
A.2d 682 (1977); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. South Windson Bank & Trust Co., 171
Conn. 63, 368 A.2d 76 (1976); Smith v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 75 Il. App. 3d 971, 394
N.E.2d 804 (1979); Salsman v. National Comm. Bank of Rutherford, 102 N.J. Super. 482,
246 A.2d 162 (1968).
19. There is no suggestion in section 1-201's definition of "unauthorized" that the
missing indorsement situation is even an analogous one. Sections 3-201 and 3-202 clearly
draw a distinction between unauthorized and missing indorsements. A payroll-padded
or fictitious payee check not indorsed "in the name of the named payee" does not, for
example, trigger the protection of section 3-405.
20. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1970 version).
21. U.C.C. § 3-419, Comment 3 (1970 version).
22. See M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 159 La. 752,
106 So. 292 (1925); Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term - Commercial Paper, 34 LA. L. REV. 293 (1974). The underlying obliga-
tion is typically discharged by payment to the holder; in the absence of the necessary
indorsement there is no holder. LA. R.S. 10:3-201, 3-202 (Supp. 1974).
23. LA. R.S. 10:4-207(1)(a) (Supp. 1974).
24. See Perkins State Bank v. Connolly, 632 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980); Puckett v.
Southeast Plaza Bank, 620 P.2d 461 (Okla. App. 1980). If the instrument's "face
amount" included a stipulation for attorney's fees, section 3-419(2) arguably provides
the basis for awarding such fees.
25. Section 4-207(3) indicates that damages for breach of the implied warranties in-
[Vol. 42
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Misencoding and Misrouting of Items
Computerized handling of checks in the bank collection process
is made possible by the Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR)
system. The typical check is pre-encoded with magnetic numerals
and characters representing the drawee's identification number and
the drawer's account number, which bank computers are programmed
to "read." Upon deposit by the holder,, the amount of the check is
also encoded by the depositary bank. The depositary bank's com-
puter reads the drawee's identification number and automatically
sorts and routes the check to the drawee. Upon arrival at the
drawee bank, a computer is programmed to debit the drawer's ac-
count or to "kick out" the check if it was either drawn against insuf-
ficient funds, or has been subjected to a stop payment order, or if
the drawer's account otherwise requires special handling."8 Both
over-encoding and under-encoding by the depositary bank of the
amount payable create liability potential for both the depositary and
the drawee bank." As Morris v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc. 8
reveals, the printer of the checks has contractual liability for
damage to the drawer's credit reputation caused by the dishonor re-
sulting from erroneous routing symbols printed on the drawer's
checks.
Magnetic encoding and computerized handling of checks are
banker's conveniences, but banks are not immune from liability if
they rely on erroneous encoding. In Morris, for example, the drawee
bank's name correctly appeared on the drawer's checks,"' so that the
elude finance charges and "expenses related to the item, if any." LA. R.S. 10:4-207(3)
(Supp. 1974). U.C.C. Comment 5 to section 4-207 states that the "expenses" referred to
"may be ordinary collection expenses and in appropriate cases could also include such
expenses as attorneys fees." The comment does not suggest what are "appropriate"
cases.
26. See generally B. CLARK & A. SQUILLANTE. THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COL.
LECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 213-18 (1970).
27. Payment of the over-encoded amount would possibly result in the wrongful
dishonor of subsequently presented items; but to dishonor the item as an overdraft on
the basis of the over-encoded amount would be a wrongful dishonor if the actual
amount ordered paid by the drawer could have been paid. Payment of an under-
encoded amount would not be in accordance with the order of the drawer. See cases at
note 31, infra. The collecting bank presumably would be subject to a negligence claim.
Cf. Exchange Bank of St. Augustine v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 292 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1974)
(mis-encoding of drawee's identification number by collecting bank); Citizens State
Bank v. Martin, 609 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1980) (raising the issue of drawee negligence); State
ez rel. Gabalac v. Firestone Bank, 46 Ohio App. 2d 124, 346 N.E.2d 326 (1975) (payment
by drawee of an over-encoded check). See also First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Augusta v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 238 Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d 1 (1977).
28. 395 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
29. See LA. R.S. 10:3-104(2)(b) (Supp. 1974). That the drawee's name will appear on
a check seems to be assumed by the U.C.C. because N.I.L. section 1(5), which required
19821 335.
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collecting banks had mis-routed the checks by following only the
magnetically encoded drawee identification number. Likewise, a
drawee that overpays or underpays a check on the basis of an
amount erroneously encoded by the depositary bank has failed to
follow the order of its customer."
THE RIGHTS OF THE HOLDER
The Liability of the Nonaccepting Drawee
The holder of a dishonored check or draft has rights against the
drawer and any prior indorsers," but he has no rights on the instru-
ment against the non-accepting drawee." Because rights against a
drawer who resides elsewhere are of little practical benefit to the
merchant, he often contacts the drawee to determine whether the
check, if taken by him in lieu of cash or another payment method,
will be honored. However, bankers tend to be coy in handling such
inquiries ' and a contract to accept or pay the check will not often be
found. It is even less likely that actionable representations by the
drawee as to the drawer's account will be made.35 A statement by
the banker that the drawer's draft or check "will be honored,"
however, did result in an obligation to honor in Carrol v. Twin City
that the drawee's name be indicated with reasonable certainty, was omitted by the
U.C.C.
30. LA. R.S. 10:4-202(a) (Supp. 1974). Under LA. R.S. 10:3-118(c) (Supp. 1974), words
control figures, unless the words themselves are ambiguous. If MICR characters are
likened to "figures" the name of the drawee would control the issue of proper routing.
See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. State Bank of Salem, 412 N.E. 2d 103 (Ind. App.
1980). Section 1-102(3) does permit the collecting bank to vary a provision such as sec-
tion 3-118(c) by contract so long as the variance does not amount to an exculpation of
negligence. See Hersbergen, The Bank Customer Relationship Under the Louisiana
Commercial Laws, 36 LA. L. REv. 29, 43-55 (1975).
31. See LA. R.S. 10:3-118(c), 4-401 (Supp. 1974); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Augusta v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 238 Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d 1 (1977); State ex
rel. Gabalac v. Firestone Bank, 46 Ohio App. 2d 124, 346 N.E.2d 326 (1975).
32. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2), 3-414 (Supp. 1974). Depending on the reason for dishonor,
the holder may also have implied warranty rights. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(2) (Supp. 1974).
33. LA. R.S. 10:3-409 (Supp. 1974). But see LA. R.S. 10:3-418, 4-213(1), 4-302 (Supp.
1974). By section 3-409 a check or draft "does not of itself operate as an assignment of
any funds in the hands of the drawee." Though it is rare, holders have succeeded in
showing special fact situations which permit a court to find an assignment. See Mid-
Continent Cas. Co. v. Jenkins, 410 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1965). See also Fortier v. Delgado &
Co., 122 F. 604 (5th Cir. 1903) (applying Louisiana law).
34. An excellent example of the care with which such inquiries are handled by
bankers is seen in Night & Day Bank of St. Louis v. First Nat' Bank of Shreveport,
150 La. 954, 91 So. 405 (1922).
35. See Sabin Meyer Reg. Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga.
1980); C & S Nat'l Bank v. Levitz Furn. of Eastern Region, Inc., 147 Ga. 295, 248
S.E.2d 556 (Ga. App. 1978).
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Pontiac Used Cars, Inc.3" This case demonstrates the meaning of the
statement in section 3-409(2) that: "Nothing in this Section shall af-
fect any liability in contract, tort, or otherwise arising from any ...
obligation or representation which is not an acceptance."37
DEFENSES TO PAYMENT
Discharge by Impairment of Collateral
Among the various defenses which can be asserted against a
holder are the discharge defenses.38 By their nature, discharge
defenses can frequently be asserted against even a holder in due
course. 9 A frequent example of the defense of discharge is provided
by cases in which the holder unjustifiably impairs the collateral
given by or on behalf of a party against whom the holder has
recourse."0 The term "unjustifiably impairs" was held inapplicable in
American Discount Corp. v. Glover," where the holder knew that
the obligor was moving out of state, but did not prevent the obligor
from loading the collateral on a truck, apparently believing the
obligor's representation that the collateral would remain in St. Martin
Parish."' When the holder was subsequently unable to locate either
the obligor or the collateral, it sued the accommodation maker, to
whom the unjustifiable impairment of collateral defense was held
unavailable. Even assuming that the holder would have had suffi-
cient time to institute legal proceedings to prevent the impairment,
the third circuit was not convinced that any duty to do so exists.43
36. 397 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
37. A negligently made (and erroneous) statement as to a customer's account
resulted in liability in Bank of Nevada v. Butler Aviation-O'Hare, Inc., 616 P.2d 398
(Nev. 1980). Cf. First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Ulibarri, 557 P.2d 1221 (Colo. App. 1976)
(bank may be estopped under section 1-103 to deny the truth of its representation that
the check in question was "finally settled").
38. LA. R.S. 10:3-601(1) (Supp. 1974).
39. In general, if the holder has notice of any defense against the instrument on
the part of any person, he cannot acquire holder in due course status on his own. LA.
R.S. 10:3-302(11(c) (Supp. 1974). If the holder's transferor had the rights of a holder in
due course, however, the holder is entitled to assert such rights as his own. LA. R.S.
10:3-201 (Supp. 1974). Notice of discharge does not, of itself, constitute notice of a
defense, unless the holder has notice that all parties to the instrument have been
discharged. LA. R.S. 10:3-304(1)(b) (Supp. 1974). Thus, one may become a holder-in due
course despite knowledge or notice of a discharge, but the party discharged may raise
his defense against the holder in due course. LA. R.S. 10:3-602 (Supp. 1974).
40. LA. R.S. 10:3-606(1)(b) (Supp. 1974).
41. 391 So. 2d 853 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
42. The obligor was not delinquent in payments on the note at the time. 391 So.
2d at 854.
43. The opinion observes that a different case is presented where the holder con-
sents to removal of collateral from the state. See Glass v. McLendon, 66 So. 2d 369
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
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ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS
Customer Liability for Unauthorized Transfers
Congress acted in 1978 to protect those bank customers who
utilize the electronic fund transfer system (EFTS) offered by virtual-
ly all banks. In theory the customer's risks are slight, since an unau-
thorized withdrawal from the customer's account can only be ef-
fectuated by one who not only has the customer's EFTS card but
also knows the customer's "personal identification code" (PIC). In im-
posing limits on customer liability for unauthorized electronic trans-
fers," Congress was apparently concerned that very human (but
very negligent) acts, such as keeping the EFTS card and the PIC in
the same wallet, purse, briefcase or drawer would permit one's life
savings to evaporate at the hands of a rascal. If Judd v. Citibank'5 is
a reliable indication of unauthorized electronic fund transfer litiga-
tion, the concern was unnecessary. According to the customer's ver-
sion of the facts, no one was authorized by her to use her card, nor
was her PIC either revealed to anyone or ever written down. Fur-
thermore, the customer produced evidence that she had not been at
the bank on the occasions during which the disputed withdrawals
had been made. According to the bank's evidence, only someone
possessing both her card and her PIC could have made the
withdrawals; and the bank's employees were shown to have no
retrieval access to the computer and could not have obtained the
PIC for her account. It would be difficult to imagine a better exam-
ple of human-versus-machine credibility. The court in the Judd case
sided with the human, awarding her the amount of the disputed
withdrawals.'"
The Judd opinion placed on the bank the burden of proof that
the transfer was authorized, consistent with, but without express
reliance on, 12 U.S.C. § 1693g(b).' 7 Once a transfer is classified as
"unauthorized" Congress has mandated that the liability of a con-
sumer:
8
In no event ... shall . . . exceed the lesser of (1) $50; or (2) the
amount of money . . . obtained in such unauthorized electronic
fund transfer prior to the time the financial institution is
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (Supp. 1978).
45. 435 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1980).
46. The opinion stresses that the bank's own witness testified to various physical
malfunctions in the bank's system. 435 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
47. The cited section places the burden of proof on the financial institution to
show that the transfer was authorized.
48. For purposes of section 1693g, a consumer means a natural person. 15 U.S.C. §
1693a(5) (Supp. 1978).
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notified of, or otherwise becomes aware of, circumstances which
lead to the reasonable belief that an unauthorized electronic
fund transfer involving the consumer's account has been or may
be effected.'"
The success of banks in cases such as Judd depends on proof that
the disputed transfer was authorized; and the Judd case makes the
possibility of such success somewhat remote.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a) (Supp. 1978). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (Supp. 1970) (liability
of credit card holder for unauthorized use).
